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Ohio Pleading Practice-The
Motion to Strike and the Motion to
Make Definite and Certain
Samuel Sonenfield and Joseph Kalk
INTRODUCTION
TO THE ATTORNEY -for the plaintiff, the granting of a motion by
the defendant to strike or a motion to make definite and certain, is a most
vexing problem. It involves the redrafting of a pleading on which he has
already spent considerable time. It means he must expend additional
time to "clean-up" a petition - time which might easily have been con-
served had he drafted his original pleading in conformity with Ohio
pleading practices. Because
of the contingent fee ar-
SAMUEL SONENFIELD (A.B., 1934, Harvard, rangement which prevails
LL.B., 1938, Western Reserve) is Associate in much legal work today,
Professor of Law at Western Reserve Univer-
sity. this involves time and
money for which he will
JOsEPH KALK (B.B.A., 1957, Western Reserve, realize no additional com-
LL.B., 1959, Western Reserve) was a former pensation; additional time
Associate Editor of the Western Reserve Law
Review. to save his fee. It -is from
such a "practical" view-
point that plaintiffs' at-
torneys ought to pay heed, to some extent at least, to pleading rules.
To defendants' attorneys, because of the widespread practice in this
state of sending the pleadings into the jury room, the filing of such
motions is often an indispensable strategic measure, intended to protect
their clients' rights from being prejudiced by inflammatory, argumenta-
tive pleadings which would give the plaintiff an opportunity to continue
to "argue" his case in the jury room.
These "practical" considerations, however great, are not, in the final
anaylsis, the bases for granting such motions. The real reason can be
found in an examination of the purposes of pleading.
Pleadings have moved a long way from the declarations at common
law, yet, a basic thread of similarity obtains - i.e., notice. A funda-
mental purpose of any pleading is to put the adverse party on notice of
the claims, defenses, issues and matters which he must be prepared to
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meet, should the case reach the trial stage. It therefore follows that
pleadings are to contain such allegations, and only such allegations, as
are necessary to put the adverse party on novice. To plead less may be
to fail to state a cause of action or a defense; to plead more is to exceed
the permitted scope of the pleadings; to plead them ambiguously is utterly
to fail to satisfy the requisites of notice. The first of these failures is
attacked by demurrer; the second by a motion to strike; the last, by a mo-
tion to make definite and certain. The code demurrer is not within the
scope of this paper.
MOTION TO STRIKE
The motion to strike is the proper tool for deleting objectionable mat-
ter from a pleading - matter which is objectionable because it is in-
flammatory, repetitious or obscene, or because it fails to allege facts, but
rather, sets forth conclusions of law or evidentiary matter. The recogni-
tion of such a motion in the code states, is tacit approval of a party's ab-
solute right to make his adversary conform, at some point, to the rules
of pleading. In other words, the motion to strike reaches the pleading
which contains more than is permitted to satsify the purposes of pleading.
MOTION TO MAKE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN
The motion to make definite and certain does not reach the "surplus-
age" in a pleading, but rather seeks to add allegations of fact to a plead-
ing, sufficient as against a demurrer, but too vague or incomplete fully to
apprise the adverse party of the claims made.
These procedures by no means create a dichotomy. It is seldom the
task of the pleader to determine whether one motion or the other will
lie in a given situation, but rather, which of the motions will better
serve his purposes in the case at hand. It is not infrequent that both
motions will lie to correct the same error in pleading. In such a case,
the motion to strike would seem preferable, for this removes objectionable
matter, and if in so doing the pleading is left inadequate, the pleader
must supplant it with sufficient, properly pleaded matter again to state
a cause of action. On the other hand, objectionable matter may be made
definite and certain, and still remain objectionable.
This is not the only danger. Once having sought the assistance of the
court to compel the adverse party to expand his pleading, one may not
then be in a position to complain that the matter he sought to have
more fully stated was objectionable in the first instance.
With this introduction, we proceed to our discussion of the purposes
and applications of the motions to strike and motions to make definite
and certain. There is one caveat: pleading problems seldom reach the
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higher courts in this state, from the natural reluctance of a party to rely
on his pleading and forego an argument on the merits. The cases on
which one must generally rely for authority are nisi prius cases, sprinkled
occasionally with decisions -in the courts of appeals. It must also be
borne in mind that since these issues seldom face the appellate courts,
much of what is found in their opinion is obiter dictum, but it is none-
theless some guide, albeit uncertain, to what these courts may do if
faced with the problem in the future.
THE MOTION TO STRIKE
Conclusions of Law
Perhaps the most common pleading issue to face the courts, and the
one which appears to have reached the appellate levels most frequently, is
the determination whether given allegations are conclusions of law, which
are not properly pleaded,' or whether they constitute ultimate 'facts, and as
such are properly pleaded. In the personal injury petition, perhaps the
most flagrant violation of the rule prohibiting the pleading of legal con-
clusions is the unchecked use of the terms "negligent,' 2 "careless, ' "un-
lawfu, ' 4 or "reckless. ' 5  It has been argued that when these terms are
followed by allegations of operative facts, they are not conclusions of law,
but rather, they constitute "mixed" conclusions of law and fact. As such,
it is argued, they are not subject to a motion to strikep
It was this problem which faced the court in Mays v. Morgan.7 The
court held that as against a demurrer, such allegations standing alone are
sufficient, but as against a motion to strike these terms cannot be retained
-by merely adding other allegations of fact. The court gave short shrift
to the "mixed conclusion" argument of the plaintiff, and granted a mo-
tion to strike. In effect, the court held that these terms, however used,
are conclusions of law, and are incapable of conversion into factual con-
clusions. If the words which follow sufficiently state the claim, then
the terms are unnecessary; if the words which follow are not sufficient to
1. Winzeler v. Knox, 109 Ohio St. 503, 143 N.E. 24 (1924); Heim v. Deshler-
Wallick Hotel Co., 41 N.E.2d 580, 581 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
2. Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 53 Ohio St. 370, 41 N.E. 980 (1895); Mays
v. Morgan, 145 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio C.P. 1957); Sieber v. Brown, 7 Ohio Supp.
(NE. Reporter) 113 (C.P. 1941).
3. Mays v. Morgan, 145 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
4. Gibbons v. B. & 0. R.R., 92 Ohio App. 87, 109 N.E.2d 511 (1952).
5. See Harris v. Webb, 22 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 359, 31 Ohio Dec. 387 (C.P. 1919).
6. 41 AM. JuLr Pleading § 17 (1942).
7. 145 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
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state the claim, then the plaintiff would be relying for a statement of his
cause of action on legal conclusions.
Other examples of phraseology commonly employed in personal in-
jury petitions which have been held objectionable as constituting legal
conclusions are "exercise of ordinary care to avoid the accident," "created
a nuisance,"9 "constituted a dangerous condition,"'1 "high, excessive rate
of speed,"" "without due and proper control,"'12 "without due regard for
the safety of the person and property of plaintiff,"'13 "guilty of negli-
gence' 1 4 or the allegation that the particular suit is brought under an act
of Congress. 15 It is quite evident that each of the foregoing is objection-
able for a common reason - each fails to set forth "facts," but states
the pleader's conclusion drawn from some unpleaded fact. It is equally
apparent that to supplement such allegations by the addition of operative
facts will not cure the defect, for the pleading will still contain averments
of conclusions which are in the exclusive province of the trier of facts
to deduce. Such conclusions, even though supplemented, ought to be
stricken.
The test in such cases ought not to be a search of appellate authority
governing the specific allegation under scrutiny, but rather, it ought to
be a determination of whether the allegation in the particular pleading
recites an evaluation drawn from other facts. If this is the case, the
"other facts" are the only proper allegations. This test was applied to a
petition containing the term "unlawful." The court reasoned that in its
context, this word could be equated with "negligent," and, as such, stated
a conclusion which could properly be deduced from the operative facts.
A motion to strike was granted, and the plaintiff was instructed to plead
those operative facts from which he drew his conclusion, but not the
conclusion itself.'6
From an intelligent application of the foregoing test, it would appear
that not only "negligent," "careless," "unlawful," and "reckless" should be
stricken, but also "improper," "unreasonable," "dangerous," "due care,"
8. Noseda v. Delmul, 123 Ohio St. 647, 176 N.E. 571 (1931).
9. Miller v. City of Dayton, 70 Ohio App. 173, 41 N.E.2d 728 (1941).
10. Ibid.
11. Harris v. Webb, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 359, 31 Ohio Dec. 387 (C.P. 1919).
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. v. McGinnis, 119 N.E.2d 698 (Ohio C.P.
1954).
15. Hadfield-Penfield Steel Co. v. Sheller, 108 Ohio St. 106, 141 N.E. 89 (1923).
Quaere: Is the allegation commonly found in the wrongful death action that the case
"is brought under the statute in such cases provided" proper?
16. Gibbons v. B. & 0. R.R., 92 Ohio App. 87, 109 N.E.2d 511 (1952).
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and the whole myriad of diches commonly employed in petitions to
characterize a defendant's conduct ought likewise to be stricken. In each
case, the term which is not approved represents an evaluation drawn from
facts, pleaded or unpleaded, which the jury is capable of making or not
making under proper instructions from the court. The persuasiveness,
convenience or ease of pleading in this manner ought not to be used to
justify such practices; a fortiori, neither should their use by the form
books be of any significance.
From the decided cases, it is often difficult to determine whether the
remedy available in such cases is a motion to strike, a motion to make
definite and certain, or both.17  In any event, where an obvious condu-
sion of law is attacked, a motion to strike is available as a remedy. Where
the other motion is likewise available, the former would seem to be more
desirable, for the latter seeks the operative facts in addition to the con-
clusion, while the motion to strike seeks to obviate the conclusion alto-
gether, and it would seem incumbent on the pleader to supplant it with
the operative facts in order to state a cause of action.
Specifications of Negligence
Perhaps the most difficult pleading question to plague the courts in
recent years has been the propriety of "specifications of negligence." It
has become common practice for the statement of facts in a petition filed
in a case arising out of an automobile accident to be followed by:
Defendant was negligent in the following respects and particulars:
1. In that he failed to keep his car under control.
2. In that he failed to keep a proper lookout for other persons lawfully
using the road, especially the plaintiff.
3. In that he failed to bring his car to a stop within the assured dear
distance ahead.
4. Etc., etc., etc.
Usually, the itemized statements repeat the language of a statute, but this
is not a necessary element to constitute a "specification' So common is
this practice that it has been adopted by some of the form books. But
the mere fact that the profession indulges in such practices ought not
add propriety to poor pleading. In Brown v. Pollard, Judge Bell takes the
position that:
Such specifications can be intended for but one of two reasons: either
they are designed to influence, perhaps prejudice, the jury; or they are in-
tended to inform the court of what he is expected to charge. If for the
17. See Dudakunst v. McDonald, 13 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 25 (C.P. 1943);
Russell v. Lake Shore & M.S. R.R., 6 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 353, 17 Ohio Dec. 435
(C.P. 1907). See Notes 33 and 34 infra.
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former reason, they are improper; if for the latter, they are in most cases
unnecessary. 18
It will be admitted that Judge Bell is a pioneer in this field, but he
does not hold the fort alone. The view has been taken by others that:
The proper place for counsel to argue [the specifications of negli-
gence] is to the Jury, not in his petition. 19
The authors admit that the view stated above is not universally ac-
cepted in this state. Some courts of common pleas have decided to await
a ruling from the Supreme Court, or at least from their respective courts
of appeals,2 0 before they will accept such a rule. The problem is that few,
if any, pleading questions ever reach the appellate level, for in order for
a defendant to appeal such rulings at the time they are made by the trial
court, he may have to forego his defenses on the merits. Since the real
defendant in the usual case is an insurance company, this is not likely to
happen, for although it may have a casual interest in pleading problems,
it does not extend that far. It is therefore apparent that usually all that
we can expect from the higher courts is dicta.
Recently, in Dansby v. Dansby,2 1 the Supreme Court pointed out:
We do not ascribe propriety to the practice merely because of its in-
dulgence by the practitioners. 22
It will be admitted that the foregoing reference to specifications of negli-
gence is obiter dictum,23 which is perhaps the strongest thing we can
expect, but it nevertheless indicates the feeling of at least one member of
that bench, if not all who concurred, on this controversial pleading prob-
lem.
In the usual case, the specifications are no more than a reiteration of
the facts stated earlier in the petition, and where this is the case, they
should be stricken as repetitious. 24 A plaintiff has a duty to state a
cause of action, but he only has the tight to state it once.
18. 112 N.E.2d 692 (Ohio C.P. 1953); accord, Mecum v. Beshore, 119 N.E.2d
682 (Ohio C.P. 1954); Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. v. McGinnis, 119 N.E.2d
698 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
19. Uccello v. Interstate Truck Service, Inc., 126 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
20. E.g., this apparently is the present position of the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County.
21. 165 Ohio St. 112, 133 N.E.2d 358 (1956).
22. Id. at 113, 133 N.E.2d at 359.
23. The case dealt with a divorce petition, which alleged as grounds for divorce
the naked language of the statute. The only issue actually before the court for its
determination was the sufficiency of such allegations as against a motion to make
definite and certain.




Quite frequently, the specifications are couched in the naked terms of
a statute, and where this is the case, they fail to allege facts, but rather,
allege conclusions, and should -be stricken on this ground.2 5
Most frequently, the specifications are so phrased as to persuade the
jury. Where this is the case, they are dearly improper and should be
stricken as argumentative allegations.26
It must be noted that the form of the pleading is not the determina-
tive fact. The mere numbering of averments is not per se defective
pleading. The specifications to which exception is taken in this article
are those wherein the foregoing defects of redundancy, conclusory, or
argumentative nature inhere.
It is the opinion of the authors that the "specifications of negligence"
is a mongrel pleading practice,2 7 and ought not to be condoned. There
is ample authority for any court to follow in striking such allegations.
Pleading In the Words of a Statute
Closely related to the problem concerning the "specifications of neg-
ligence" discussed in the foregoing section, is the problem of the plead-
ing which adopts the language of a statute. This is the usual form
adopted by the draftsman in alleging these so-called "specifications"
It is generally held that this form of pleading is bad, but the exact
remedy for this defect appears somewhat uncertain.2 s In some instances,
motions to make definite and certain have been granted, whereby addi-
tional facts are elicited to show the underlying conduct which allegedly
coincides with the words of the statute. In Dansby v. Dansby,29 the
court said:
Such an abbreviated and unartistic pleading as the mere statement of
statutory grounds does not so advise him [the adverse party] and consti-
tutes an open invitation to him... to make definite and certain30
But where a petition contained an averment that the defendant operated
his car ".. . at greater speed than was possible to permit him to -bring
his care to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, '31 the court
25. Dansby v. Dansby, 165 Ohio St. 112, 133 N.E.2d 358 (1956).
26. See McCune v. Industrial Nucleonics Corp., 109 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio Ct. App.
1951).
27. Oliver Y. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry., 132 N.E.2d 646 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
28. Dansby v. Dansby, 165 Ohio St. 112, 133 N.E.2d 358 (1956); Goldsberry v.
Lefevre, 24 Ohio L Abs. 146 (Ct. App. 1937).
29. 165 Ohio St. 112, 133 N.E.2d 358 (1956).
30. Id. at 114, 133 N.E.2d at 359.
31. Goldsberry v. Lefevre, 24 Ohio L Abs. 146 (Ct. App. 1937).
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concluded that this was a mere statement of statutory grounds in the exact
words of the statute, and held that:
In this situation the trial court properly struck that portion of the pe-
tition which was but a copy of the statute. [Emphasis ours].32
A similar pleading was involved in Dudakunst v. McDonald.3 3 Also
ruling on a motion to strike, the court held that the motion ought to be
treated as a motion to make definite and certain, and granted this relief.
In effect, the court overruled the defendant's motion to strike, and sua
sponte required the plaintiff to make his petition definite and certain3 4
It would seem to follow that all that a defendant need do is point
out the statutory language employed, and the court will determine
whether it shall be stricken or made definite and certain, and this, with-
out regard to what relief the defendant has asked.
No doubt there are times when the statutory language is the best
suited, or perhaps the clearest and most concise manner of stating what
the pleader would like to say. Where this is true, it should not be an
excuse for pleading no additional facts. Here, not only is the pleading
objectionable in that it fails to apprise the adverse party of those matters
on which he may be expected to defend, but it is equally defective in that
it is no more than a legal conclusion."5
The remedy in these instances ought to fit the fault to which it is
directed. Not only should the court require such allegations to be made
definite and certain, but it ought to go further and strike the naked statu-
tory language relied upon to state a cause of action. In this way, notice
to the adverse party will be effected, and in so doing, the statutory lan-
guage will have become mere surplusage, and will already have been
stricken.
Redundancy, Surplusage and Verbosity
A most vexing problem which often appears in pleading is that of
redundancy. The Code provides that a petition shall set forth facts con-
stituting a cause of action in concise language.36 This would seem to be
intended to limit excess verbosity, in an effort to speed up the judicial
process, and to lessen the load of the courts in reading the same facts
stated in several different ways in the same pleading.
32. Id. at 151.
33. 13 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 25 (C.P. 1943).
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. OHIo REV. CODE § 2309.33, provides in part: "If redundant, irrelevant, or




Obviously, the plaintiff is bound by pleading rules to set forth suf-
ficient facts to state a cause of action. He has, however, no duty nor any
right to set forth those facts more than once, in an effort .to attach undue
prominence to such facts. It would seem that the Code provision is
ample authority to strike such redundant language. In applying this rule,
the courts ought not to look for mere differences in the language used,
but rather, ought to examine the allegations attacked in an effort to de-
termine whether they add something new to the petition, or whether it
is merely a case of different words importing the identical factual setting.
The problem often comes up in the case of "specifications of negli-
gence," discussed earlier-37  In these instances, a complete factual de-
scription is followed by an itemized list of the."alleged"'acts of negligence.
All that. is being done in such a case is to. Tepeat facts. already pleaded.
By such reiteration, aided by the numbering of such specifications,
which is also a common practice, the pleader apparently hopes unduly to
impress the reader, of the petition with the importance he has attached to
these facts. Such repetitious pleading ought. to be condensed on motion
to strike.
Since-the Code unequivocally calls for a concise statement of -the cause
of action, some courts have taken the view that this calls for clarity as
well. In one case, a technically described situation was scrutinized. It was
held that good practice would require a plaintiff to make his petition
definite and- certain -by concisely stating these facts in non-techndcal
tersa8 While brevity may be a virtue, a pleading'. ought not to be
drafted in such a fashion that it can only be understood.by an expert in
the field, and a court ought to correct such. a defect, not by granting a
motion to strike, -but by an order to make definite and certain.
Once having pleaded those facts which constitute his cause of action,
the plaintiff ought to conclude that:part of. his pleading. To go further
would be to plead argumentative or. evidentiary matter, which will be
discussed in the next section. But there are cases in which the additional
allegations are neither argumentative nor evidentiary, but 'purely sur-
plusage. It would seem that such allegations are irrelevant, and could be
stricken on that ground.aa Just as irrelevant matter is not permitted in
37. See notes 17-29, supra.
38. Vogt v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 66 Ohio App. 216, 31 N.E.2d 93 (1940),
rev'd on other grounds 138 Ohio St. 233, 34 N.E.2d 197 (1941). The language
in question in this case was "chronic fibrous myocarditis" and "coronary occlusion,"
which, the court said, "are in technical language, which could be amplified in the
interest of clarity." 66 Ohio App. 216, 220, 31 N.E.2d 93, 96 (1940).
39. Sours v. Sours, 73 N.E.2d 226 (Ohio C.P. 1946), ["no driver's license"];
Bollenbacher v. Society for Savings, 62 N.E.2d 530 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945), [super-
fluous, immaterial matter]; Rider v. Gellenbeck, 7 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter)
126 (C.P. 1941), ["sentimental value," "personal pleasure and gratification"].
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evidence, so also it ought not to clutter up the issues in the pleading stage,
and should be ferreted out by a motion to strike.
Argumentative and Evidentiary Matter
Frequently a pleader attempts to win his case in the pleading stage
by inserting into his petition or answer all matter which he hopes to prove
at the trial. Where this is the case, much in the way of evidence will
creep into the pleading. This typically involves the allegation of more
than the "operative facts," and could be classified as the statement of
"supporting facts." For example, a petition may include allegations that
the defendant was seen by several witnesses, prior to -the accident driving
in a reckless manner. This is used only for illustrative purposes, but it
exemplifies the pleading of evidentiary matter.40
Two objections to such pleading practices seem to be apparent:
(1) these matters ought not to burden the pleading stage, for their
proper place is at the trial stage, and (2) such practice, if approved,
would require the application of the rules of evidence to the pleadings.
Such pleading would, in fact, cause the greater part of the issues on
the merits to be argued in the pleadings.
An equally sufficient reason for not allowing such matter to remain
in a pleading stems from the practice of many courts of sending the
pleadings into the jury room. As the jurors are not generally permitted to
take notes of the trial, a pleading which presents evidentiary matter
would do this for them, thereby circumventing the court's policies.
Equally defective is the pleading which contains argumentative mat-
ter.41 This type of pleading is distinguished from evidentiary pleading
in that here the pleader is attempting to persuade the reader to accept
his views in preference to the views of his adversary, while in an evi-
dentiary pleading he attempts to prove the truth of his allegations. In
actual practice, it is difficult, [if not impossible,] to distinguish the two,
but the same objections are applicable to both defects, thereby making the
technical difference meaningless.
The real problem in such cases is the determnation whether a given
allegation is defective in this area. There are conflicting decisions in
Ohio on the same allegations, and apparently, stare decisis is of little help
to the pleader who attempts to avoid the pitfalls in this area.
Perhaps the most that can be offered in this area is an attempt to
40. The rule prohibiting the pleading of evidentiary matters is clearly set forth in
McCune v. Industrial Nucleonics Corp., 109 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951);
in Davis v. American Rolling Mills Co., 54 Ohio App. 298, 7 N.E.2d 238 (1936),
such pleadings are vigorously denounced.
41. See notes 39-40, supra.
[September
OHIO PLEADING PRACTICE
formulate certain rules of thumb, not intended to be foolproof, which
may serve as an aid to the practitioner.
If, in the examination of a pleading, certain statements are questioned
as being argumentative or evidentiary, the first step would certainly be
to determine whether a cause of action is stated without the questioned
allegation. If so, it -is probable that the statement falls into this classifica-
tion.
If a petition attempts to persuade the reader of the justice of one
party's cause, or attempts to illustrate the nature and extent of damages
so as to provte rather than merely to state -them, or if in an answer, after
stating the defense, the pleader goes further and denies his adversary's
claim by offering matter to prove his defense, such matters dearly ought
to be stricken, if not because they are argumentative or evidentiary, then
at least for the reason that they are surplusage.
To illustrate, suppose a petition contains the allegation that "plain-
tiff suffered great pain as a result of his injuries, which is evidenced by
the fact that he was heard screaming violently immediately after the acci-
dent and until sedation was administered by a physician." Here the plain-
tiff has gone too far in attempting to plead proof of his injuries, and the
allegation after the word "injuries" is subject to a motion to strike.
In short, the test is the determination of the necessity of such "sup-
porting facts" for the statement of a sufficient cause of action or defense.
If unnecessary, they are vulnerable to attack on a motion to strike.
THE MOTION TO MAKE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN
Conclusions of Law
Much of what has been said with reference to the applicability of a
motion to strike a conclusion of law is equally applicable to the motion
to make definite and certain.42
Perhaps the most useful purpose of the motion to make definite and
certain as applied to conclusions of law occurs in the situation wherein
the conclusion of law is sufficient to -insulate the pleading from attack
on demurrer, but where the "operative" facts, if elicited, would be unable
to stand up under such an attack. In such a case, the motion to make
definite and certain would be a necessary step preceding a demurrer, and
would "prepare" the pleading for such attack.43 This would obviate the
difficulty of the well-established rule that a "demurrer cannot speak," by
causing the pleader himself to furnish those facts which will cause his
pleading to be found insufficient at law.
42. See notes 1-16, supra.
43. See Dansby v. Dansby, 165 Ohio St. 112, 133 N.E.2d 358 (1956).
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Aside from this aspect of the problem, it is suggested that in the
usual case, the motion to strike is by far the better remedy for attacking
a conclusion of law.
Ambiguous Pleadings
Clearly the most widely employed use of the motion to make definite
and certain is to achieve the removal of ambiguity from a pleading. Here
it may be used to elicit more detail about "operative" facts, such as speed,
direction, traffic signals, or any of a myriad of facts pertaining to the
cause of action or defense.44 It must be noted, however, that in this
situation the motion to make definiie and certain serves the defendant
more successfully than a plaintiff, due to the prevalence of general denials,
which obviously, will not be made definite and certain.
But this device ought not to be thought of as a panacea. It must be
used with caution. By its very nature, the motion to make definite and
certain may serve to educate the adverse party by pointing out to him his
pleading defects which may lead him on trial to adduce facts he did not
realize he must prove by allowing him to plead additional facts which
will lay the foundation for the introduction of evidence on these points
at the trial, while had no such motion been filed, the pleading might not
have been sufficient to admit some of this evidence.
On the other hand, as in the Dansby case, the pleading may be am-
biguous because it is a statement, in the bare statutory terms, of a cause of
action or defense. Upon clarification pursuant to the granting of a motion
to make definite and certain, it may develop that no cause of action in
fact exists. If this is followed by a demurrer, the motion to make definite
and certain has been a most useful tool. This applicability of the motion
to make definite and certain is of great value in a contract case, where,
by virtue of the Statute of Frauds, a memorandum is required. If the
petition is silent in this respect, it is sufficient on attack by demurrer.45
Here, on a motion to make definite and certain, the plantiff will be re-
quired to state whether the contract is oral or written, and if oral,
whether there is a memorandum of the agreement. If there is no writ-
ing pleaded in the amended petition, a demurrer should then be filed.
44. It must be remembered, however, that only such matters as are deemed material
may be elicited on a motion to make definite and certain. In Breeckner v. Coaldey,
133 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio COP. 1954), the court refused to grant a motion seeking to
determine which of two collisions, allegedly caused by concurrent tortfeasors, oc-
curred first in point of time, since such time factor is immaterial to liability. In
Spencer v. Miller, 84 Ohio App. 190, 82 N.E.2d 763 (1948), the court refused to
grant a motion seeking to determine the value of the automobile immediately before
and after the accident, on the grounds that to grant this motion would be to compel
the pleader to plead evidence.
45. On its face it states a cause of action.
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But this situation has its drawbacks as well. The plaintiff may have over-
looked the necessity of a memorandum, and may be unable to produce it
at the trial which may be as much as three years after the pleading stage.
By filing such a motion, his adversary has, put him on notice of. his needs
and he may at this early stage be, able' to procure a memorandum.
One last caveat must be mentioned. As stated earlier, after once hav-
ing elicited added matter on a.motion to make definite and certain, one
may not be in a position to complain if such matter is damaging to his
case.
To illustrate, suppose that the petition contains the allegation that
"plaintiff suffered much pain as.a result~of his injuries." If the. defendant
files a motion to make definite and certain seeking the nature and extent
of the injuries, he may not be in a -position to complain -if the plaintiff
then alleges "plaintiff's arm was pinned, under the car causing much pain,
so great that plaintiff was heard screaming. violently until sedation was
administered by a physician." Had. this: been in the ongwna pleading, it
probably would have been stricken on a motion.by the defendant.
It is apparent that 'in this area, the motion to make aefinite and cer-
tain, while a-most useful tool, is lined with pitfalls for .the unwary. Its
use should be tempered with a good measure of caution.
APPENDIX I
A MODEL PERSONAL INJURY PETITION
STATE OF OHIO
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA IN THE COURT OF COMMON
John Doe, PLEAS
123 First Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio, No. 805,567
Plaintiff,
_-
Richard Roe, PETITION FOR MONEY
567 Second Avenue ONLY
Cleveland, Ohio,
Defendant.
John Doe, plaintiff, says that First Avenue is a duly dedicated public highway;
running in a general northerly-southerly direction, in he City of Cleveland, County
of Cuyahoga, State of Ohio, and that Second Avenue is likewise a duly dedicated
public highway running in a general easterly-westerly direction, in said city; that
said highways intersect at approximately right angles at a point. within the cty limits
of the City of Cleveland, and that a traffic signal, commonly.called a stop sign, exists
at said intersection, directing the east-west traffic to stop before entering said inter-
section.
On or about January 1, 1959, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, plaintiff was
travelling in a northerly direction along First Avenue, at a rate of speed approximat-
ing 20 miles per hour, and as he entered said intersection, defendant Richard Roe,
travelling in a westerly direction on Second Avenue, at a rate of speed approximat-
ing 60 miles per hour, failed to bring his vehicle to a stop before entering said inter-
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section, and failed to give warning of this to plaintiff, and failed to decrease the
speed of his vehicle or alter its course. As a result of defendant's failure to do any
of the above acts, defendant's vehicle collided with plaintiff's vehicle, causing plain-
tiff to be thrown about in his vehicle, to his injury, and causing damage to plaintiff's
vehicle and to plaintiff's person, all of which will be more specifically pointed out
below.
As a result of being so thrown about in his vehicle, plaintiff suffered numerous
cuts, bruises and contusions of the face, arms and legs, a compound fracture of the
right forearm and left ankle, cervical and lumbar whiplash, and a fracture of the
skull.
As a result of these injuries, plaintiff was required to expend funds in the amount
of two thousand eight hundred and seventy-five and 98/100 dollars ($2,875.98)
for medical services, and was unable to perform his regular duties as a tool and die
maker for a period of six months following said collision, and is presently unable
to work a full, regular working week, although there is demand for his services.
Plaintiff is suffering, and from what is presently determinable, will continue to
suffer from chronic headaches, a pain in the right forearm and left ankle, and is
permanently scarred about the face, arms and legs.
Also as a result of said collision, plaintiff's automobile, which had a market value
of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) before said collision, was totally demolished,
having only a scrap value of fifty dollars ($50.00) thereafter.
Plaintiff says that as a result of all the foregoing he has been damaged in the
sum of eighty-five thousand dollars ($85,000.00).
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant herein in the
amount of eighty-five thousand ($85,000.00) dollars, and his costs in this action.
APPENDIX II
A MODEL CONTRACT PETITION
(For the sake of brevity, headings have been omitted in the following pleading.)
John Doe, plaintiff, says that on or about January 2, 1957, in the City of Cleve-
land, County of Cuyahoga, State of Ohio, he and defendant, Richard Roe, entered
into an agreement, in writing, wherein plaintiff promised to pay to defendant the
sum of five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars on the fifteenth day of January 1957, and
defendant promised to convey on that date certain real estate, more specifically de-
scribed below, to plaintiff herein by a general warranty deed.
Plaintiff further says that on or about January 15, 1957, he tendered to defendant
the sum of five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars and demanded that defendant execute
said general warranty deed; that defendant refused, and continues to refuse to accept
such tendered money, and refused and continues to refuse to execute said general
warranty deed to plaintiff or in any other way convey the property herein involved
to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff further says that, to the best of his knowledge, defendant is the sole and
undisputed owner of the real estate in question, to wit:
[Enter legal description of real estate]
Plaintiff further says that on or about January 15, 1957, said real estate had a
current market value of five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars, and that at or about the
time when this action was commenced the value of said real estate, measured by the
current market price, was twelve thousand ($12,000.00) dollars, and that as a result
of the failure of defendant to fulfill the promises set forth above, plaintiff has been
damaged in the amount of seven thousand ($7,000.00) dollars.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant herein in the
amount of eighty-five thousand dollars ($85,000.00), and his costs in this action.
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